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I. Introduction
Meiji Japan was subject to two quite distinct views regarding
international relations. One, that Japan was part of the traditional
hierarchical order centred on China. Two, Commodore Matthew Perry’s
arrival in 1853, gave Japan little choice but to participate in the
western-ordered system of international relations that was then moving
to dominate the globe. Moreover, since Asia proved to be a key theatre
where the great powers played out their rivalries, amongst Japanese
statesmen and intellectuals there grew a strong sense of the dangers
posed by the outside world. Thus it was that Meiji Japan aimed at
joining western society by, simultaneously pouring its e#orts into
forming a “civilised” modern nation state, and devoting enormous
resources and labour into ensuring its security and the independence.
The tensions produced between the push-and-pull of these two views
caused great stress in Meiji Japan.i
For most of the nineteenth century, the power most recognised as a
direct menace to Japan in East Asia was the Qing Empire, which sat at
the very centre of this traditional Chinese world order; followed by
Russia, which also held territory in close proximity to Japan.ii Wedged
between these two great powers, how was Japan to enrich the nation
and to preserve its independence? A great turning point came with
victory in the 189495 Sino-Japanese War. This heightened tensions
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with Russia, that foreshadowed future problems.
II. The Birth of Imperial Japan as the ‘Leader of Asia’
Victory in the 190405 Russo-Japanese War resulted in a signiﬁcant
breakthrough for Japan by raising its international standing and
enhancing its national security. Concretely, the manifestations of these
achievements were the annexation of Korea in August 1910, and the
conclusion of a new Treaty of Commerce and Trade signed in February
and April 1911 with Great Britain and the United States respectively.
The former guaranteed national security and the latter signiﬁed Japan’s
acceptance as an equal and sovereign power within the framework of
western international relations. Thus it was that Japan resolved the
diplomatic concerns it had pursued since early Meiji. Symbolic of the
Japanese victory over Russia and its enhanced international position,
the British lost no time in upgrading the status of its mission in Japan to
embassy in December 1905.
Japan’s participation in Western international society as an equal
sovereign nation connoted the recognition of Japan as a key participant
in global imperialism. Therefore, the advent of a new era of Japan’s
diplomacy coincided with the dawn of the globalization of the West’s
international system. Given this, the Russo-Japanese War was a conﬂict
which marked the ‘beginning of the twentieth century’ as one of ‘global
conﬂicts amongst the great powers’.
The annexation of Korea, moreover, was accomplished by the
Japan-Korea Treaty of Annexation, that is, a treaty between two
sovereign nations in accordance with international law. At the same
time, it is also important to note that the Japanese emperor issued an
imperial rescript acknowledging the former Korean sovereign as a king
with a standing equal to the Japanese imperial family. The traditional
hierarchical order of Asia with China at its centre had collapsed with
Japan’s triumph in the Sino-Japanese War. Still, the concept of the
traditional hierarchical order persisted, but now with Japan at its centre.
In this sense, victory in 1895 and 1905 signiﬁed the rise of imperial
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Japan as the ‘leader of Asia’.
III. Japan’s Transition to being a Continental Asian State and a
Strategy of Aggression
How did and in what ways did Japan’s military change its
perceptions of Japanese security and strategy following the changes in
Japanese international standing and security, developments that it had
indeed played a role in bringing about. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War,
the military, in accordance with the Army’s annual strategic plans,
anticipated a defensive war fought in the Japanese home islands against
an enemy attack.iii This strategic concept of an ‘island empire’ which
had as its axis a naval defence of the Japanese main islands appealed to
the Imperial Navy, and was an important representation of Japan and its
strategic thinking. This view of an island nation, heavily reliant on
foreign trade, informed Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonbei’s strategic
thinking. In June 1903, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War,
Yamamoto viewed that ‘it would be acceptable to lose Korea as it would
su$ce that the Empire defend its core island territories’.iv
The September 1905 Portsmouth Treaty, however, granted Japan
concessions and privileges in Port Arthur, Dairen, the southern branch
line of the East China Railway (south of Changchun), making it possess
enormous interests in Manchuria. Further, through the formal
annexation of Korea, its development as a Japanese defensive barrier,
and the acquisition of colonies and interests on the Asian mainland,
maritime Japan also developed as a continental power. Earlier,
Yamagata Aritomo, the Japanese Army’s senior ﬁgure, made this clear
in his policy speech as prime minister to the ﬁrst session of the Imperial
Diet in December 1890. That is, the ‘way to Japan’s independence and
self defence’ lay in the home islands being the ‘line of sovereignty’. In
turn, their security in actual fact resided in preserving the Korean
Peninsula as the ‘line of strategic interest’.v On such geopolitical
matters, phrases such as ‘line of sovereignty’ and ‘line of strategic
interest’ speak volumes of Japan’s subsequent emergence as a
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continental power now sharing borders with Russia and China. The
years immediately following the Russo-Japanese War thus showed a
marked change in Japan’s geopolitical position in East Asia.
At this point there is clearly a major transformation of an Imperial
Japan having a defensive strategy to that of being a continental power
advocating a strategy more orientated towards o#ense. In the ‘1906
Outlines of Imperial Japanese Army Strategic Planning’, issued by
Emperor Meiji in February, the Imperial Army for the ﬁrst time
proposed an o#ensive continental strategy.vi This found expression in
Japan’s ﬁrst national-defence policy known by the general title of ‘The
Policy for Imperial Defence’ (Teikoku kokuboˆ hoˆshin) in April 1907, that
subsumed three related plans: ‘A Policy of National Defence for the
Empire of Japan’ (Nihon Teikoku no kokuboˆ hoˆshin), ‘Troop Strength
Required for National Defence’ (Kokuboˆ ni yoˆsuru heiryoku) and ‘A
General Outline of the Strategies of the Imperial Forces’ (Teikokugun no
yoˆheikoˆryoˆ). The military factors that made this shift to an o#ensive
continental policy possible was Japan’s naval victory in the Russo-
Japanese War. In other words, it was the Imperial Navy’s overwhelming
superiority in East Asia and its ability to secure control of the seas,
which permitted the projection of military force on to the Asian
continent.vii
IV. Renegotiating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Establish-
ment of an Imperial Defence Policy
Fearful of a Russia bent on a war of revenge, led Japan’s political
and military leaders to renegotiate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in
August 1905 in the waning days of the Russo-Japanese War. By the
revision, the Alliance came to include stipulations concerning mutual-
defence obligations; that is, if Great Britain and Russia came to blows,
then Japan would enter the conﬂict and attack Russian forces in
Manchuria.viii This new military commitment was a factor in the
Imperial Army’s conversion to a more aggressive strategy towards the
continent. Moreover, by the new Treaty, Great Britain was no longer
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obligated to maintain its Far Eastern Fleet at a level superior to that of
any naval force, which handed to the Imperial Navy a new role of
providing a maritime defence of British regional interests. By this
means, Japan was beckoned to maintain a signiﬁcant naval presence.ix
This meant that the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance undergirded
military support for Japan’s shift to becoming a continental power.
These arrangements under the new Alliance obligated Japanese
military authorities to formulate speciﬁc plans to co-ordinate their
military activities with those of Great Britain. In turn this development
required the adoption of a grand plan for national defence and led to the
‘Policy of National Defence for the Empire of Japan’ with Russia as the
main hypothetical enemy.x
As we can see from the above, the development of Japan as a
continental power, subsequent to its victory over Russia and the
conclusion of a revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had a signiﬁcant
impact on the Japanese military. This meant that the Army would be
directly involved in protecting Japan’s continental interests and in
maintaining and expanding its colonies. The Navy, for its part, would
secure the sea-lanes between Japan and the continent and repulse any
maritime foreign threat to Japan. Together, they gave fresh support to
Japan’s continental policy.xi The new signiﬁcance for the military was
the shedding of the factionalism of the Meiji period, and the rise of an
independent policy-making institution with its own agenda.
V. The Cost of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese
Accord
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was beneﬁcial to the Imperial Navy in
that it would curtail the resurrection of Russian naval power (in the Far
East), but the Army, which was hypothesising along the lines of a
Russian war of revenge against Japan, gained relatively little.xii This
imbalance was recognised, for example, by the General Sta# O$ce’s
Lieutenant-colonel Tanaka Gi’ichi, a key strategist who drafted the
Army’s proposals for imperial defence in August 1906, that were
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incorporated into Yamagata’s ‘Policy for Imperial Defence’ in October
later that year.xiii According to Tanaka, in the event of war with Russia,
any British military operations on the Russo-Indian frontiers would
have no impact upon Japanese operations should Russo-Japanese
hostilities break out in Manchuria. However, should a Russo-Japanese
war break out following an Anglo-Russian War, this conﬂict will not be
contained as a side show but will instead be the major conﬂict.
Therefore, the ‘beneﬁts of the Alliance will be entirely England’s’. He
candidly remarked: I am at pains to see any strategic beneﬁts
redounding to our Army, but see merely political considerations
involved. Tanaka therefore had given voice to those the Army who had
grave doubts about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and expected little
stemming from England’s military cooperation with Japanese forces.xiv
Tanaka himself highly valued British colonial interests in South
China, including concessions along the Yangtze River. This can be seen
in his ‘Random Thoughts’ (Zuikan zatsuroku) which was written over
AprilJuly 1906. In it he candidly stated that he would ﬁnd it expedient
to rid ourselves of the alliance with Great Britain in favour of an alliance
with Russia. This would allow us to take over British concessions in
the Far East while Russia could bear down upon Britain’s crown jewel,
India.xv However, this Defending the North while Advancing South 
 conception of an anti-British alliance was suppressed through
the formation of ‘the Policy for Imperial Defence’, which was predicated
upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Yamagata, on the other hand, in his
evaluation of national security requirements following the Russo-
Japanese War called for strengthening the partnership with the Qing
Empire. He was particularly concerned that Russia, the foremost enemy
and China, the second greatest threat would unite and confront Japan.
In other words, based on his concern that China would become a power
and be again a military threat to Japan, Yamagata believed that it was
necessary for Japan to be prepared for a war against Japan by a united
Russia and China.xvi
Moreover, Matsuishi Yasuharu (General Sta# O$ce, Second
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[Intelligence] Division head and contributor to the ‘Imperial Defence
Policy’) posed the question in his December 1906 work, ‘Opinions on
National Defence’: namely, what form would the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance take in the future? He not only conceived of Russia as a
hypothetical enemy, but also raised the possibilities of a Russo-Chinese
as well as a Russo-German Alliance.xvii ‘The Policy for Imperial Defence’
(A Policy of National Defence for the Empire of Japan) even suggested
that given a Russo-German Alliance, Russia will feel secure in its
western borders, so that it will then be able to deploy its maximum
troop strength and railway resources for operations in East Asia. In this
way a Russo-German Alliance was the stu# of nightmares in terms of
Japan’s defence environment.xviii Japanese leaders perceptions of the
international situation based on their judgment of the value of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, (their judgment of) Russia’s place in the
international sphere, and added to their projections of Japan’s national
defence requirements, were a#ected by the changes in the imperialistic
international in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War that brought
Japan, England, Russia, and France in close proximity in their need to
consider their respective interests. All the foregoing were major factors
in driving Tokyo to conclude the ﬁrst Russo-Japanese Accord in July
1907.
VI. Conclusion
Russia and Japan gradually strengthened the Accord through
several revisions (July 1910 and July 1912), and with the Fourth Accord
(July 1916), they emerged as allies in a defensive partnership directed at
China. Yet, it must also be remembered that in no way whatsoever was
this new alliance based on mutual trust.
For example, in 1911 Yamagata Aritomo indicated his belief that
‘Russia bore an enormous grudge’ towards Japan and that ‘sooner or
later, will plan its revenge against us’.xix In reality, both nations worked
towards expanding and developing their armed forces. To the very end,
any Russo-Japanese accord was simply no more than a marriage of
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convenience between two imperialist nations.
Moreover, in terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which originally
construed Russia as the mutual enemy, this new Russo-Japanese
friendship worked to weaken the basis of Japan’s British alliance.
It is similarly important to note that in the Third Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, the United States was actually removed from the list of
hypothetical enemies. In the midst of US and Japanese antagonism,
which became increasingly apparent over Manchuria and Japanese
emigration to America, this revision was proposed by the British as they
struggled to ﬁnd a way to sustain the Alliance in light of their own
accord with the United States (that war with U.S. is inconceivable) and
the Japanese perception of Washington as its second hypothetical
enemy. While Japan accepted this revision, in actual fact the capacity of
the Alliance to curtail the United States would now be lost.xx
In response to these developments, the Imperial Navy held ‘a critical
view that the Alliance is on the verge of ending in complete
ine#ectiveness’.xxi In a similar vein, Yamagata was also expressing
concerns on this matter and stated that ‘in the event of war with the
United States we can rule out any co-operation from Great Britain.’xxii
On the eve of the November 1911 Chinese Revolution, fresh questions
were again asked on the signiﬁcance itself of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.xxiii On the other hand, there were still those, such as Foreign
Minister Komura Jutaroˆ and the Japanese ambassador to Great Britain,
(and former Foreign Minister) Katoˆ Takaaki, representing the pro-
Anglo-Japanese Alliance position and who were intimately involved in
re-negotiating the Alliance speaking loudly on its behalf. In the
aftermath of the victory over Russia, the Japanese military, in particular
the Imperial Army, continued to pay full heed to both the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance and the Accord with Russia, and by this to play an
active role in Imperial Japan’s continental policy.
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